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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff- Respondent, 
vs. 
KENNETH \VILLIAM ERVIN 
and CARL ARCHIE ANDRE\V, 
Defendants-Appellants. 
Case No. 
11158 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF CASE 
Appellant Ervin appeals from a conviction of 
assault with a deadly weapon with the intent to commit 
robbery and appellant Andrew appeals from a convic-
tion as an accessory to an assault with a deadly weapon 
with the intent to commit robbery. 
1 
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DISPOSITION IN THE LO,VER COURT 
On September 26, 1967, appellants were found 
guilty of the above-mentioned charges by a jury verdict 
in the }..,if th District Court in and for Juab County, 
Nephi, Utah. The Honorable C. Nelson Day, Judge 
of the Eifth Judicial District, presided. 
On October 10, 1967, appellants argued a Motion 
for a New Trial which was denied. Sentence was im-
posed upon the defendants by Judge Day. Commitment 
was stayed pending the decision of this appeal. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The respondent requests that this court uphold the 
jury verdict of the lower court, sustaining the convic-
tion of defendants. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendant Kenneth William Ervin was traveling 
from Los Angeles, California to Rawlins, Wyoming, 
when his car broke down near Levan, Utah on June 25, 
1967. Reaching Levan, Utah, he called his mother in 
Rawlins, Wyoming, to assist him, since the car trouble 
was serious. On June 26, 1967, around noon, Mr. Ervin's 
mother, his brother Dino and the codefendant Carl 
Archie Andrew arrived in Levan. Mr. Ervin and Mr. 
Andrew chained Mr. Ervin's car to his mother's and 
around 2:00 p.m. started for Rawlins, 'Vyoming. 
2 
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The towing car had trouble with overheating and 
stops were made along the way, one near the victim's 
home. While the defendants were stopped, they pro-
ceeded to the home of the victim, Mrs. Gaydra Jackman, 
located off the main highway. They entered her home 
and in the next 45 minutes, Mr. Ervin threatened her 
with a gun, severely beat her around the head, made 
improper advances and took $7.00 in cash, Mrs. Jack-
man' s wristwatch and her husband's pistol. Mr. Andrew 
stood outside the home for most of the time where he 
was seen and identified by Mr. Dan Hatch Warner. 
Defendants rejoined their group and proceeded to Raw-
lins, Wyoming. 
On June 29, 1967, the defendants were arrested in 
Rawlins, Wyoming, and returned to Utah waiving 
extradition. At this time, defendants were informed of 
their rights by the Juab County Sheriff. (Tr. 23) Also, 
a Rawlins, '¥"yarning attorney notified Mr. Udell Jen-
sen of Nephi, Utah, concerning the case. (Tr. pg. 16 
line 9-30) 
On July 5, 1967, a line-up was held at the Utah 
State Prison, after which the victim, Mrs. Gaydra 
Jackman, identified Mr. Andrew positively but was 
hesitant in her identification of Mr. Ervin. The line-up 
was properly conducted and Mrs. Jackman was not 
subject to any suggestive questions or statements dur-
ing the course of the line-up. 
On August 15, 1967, the defendants were arraigned 
on the information. Upon seeing Ervin wearing dark 
3 
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glasses, which he wore during the period of time he 
was with the victim, Mrs. Jackman made a positive 
identification. This positive identification was made to 
the District Attorney. The trial was later held and 
defendants were found guilty by a jury verdict. 
ARGU.MENT 
POINT I 
THERE WAS NO PREJUDICIAL ERROR 
COMMITTED BY THE TRIAL COURT IN 
EXCLUDING EVIDENCE OF DEFENDANTS' 
REPUTATION AND CHARACTER. DE-
FENSE COUNSEL'S FAILURE TO OBJECT 
TO THE COURT'S RULING PRECLUDES 
THE RAISING OF THIS ISSUE ON APPEAL. 
Appellant claims that the trial court's ruling that 
the defendants' witness' could only testify as to defend-
ants' reputation in the community for truth and veracity 
instead of their general good character in the commu-
nity was prejudicial error. ''7"hile the state admits that 
there is authority supporting appellants' contention that 
the ruling was erroneous, the state contends that any 
such error was not prejudicial to defendants requiring 
this court to overturn the conviction or remand for a 
new trial. Under Utah Code Ann. § 77-42-1 (1953) ,1 
1 The statute reads that: . . . 
After hearing an appeal the court must give Judgment with-
out regard to errors or defects which do not affect the. sub-
stantial rights of the parties. If error has been committed, 
it shall be presumed to have resulted in preju~i~e. The court 
must be satisfied that it has that ctkct before it is warranted 
in reversing the judgment. 
4 
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the court is to recognize and give effect to errors only 
if they are prejudicial to defendants. In this case, the 
trial court's ruling was not prejudicial to defendants. 
In applying this statute, the court must be con-
vinced that if error occurred, such error affected the 
substantial rights of the party before the error will be 
deemed prejudicial and affect the determination of the 
case on appeal. In State v. Neal, 1 Utah 2d 122, 262 
P.2d 756, 759 ( 1953), this court said, "'¥" e will not 
reverse criminal causes for mere error or irregularity. 
It is only when there has been error which is both sub-
stantial and prejudicial to the rights of the accused that 
a reversal is warranted." This court also stated in State 
v. Estes, 52 Utah 572, 176 Pac. 271 ( 1918), " ... this 
court may not reverse a judgment unless some substan-
tial right of the defendant has been invaded or ignored." 
In applying this statute, a test was enunciated by this 
court in State v. UToods, 62 Utah 397, 220 Pac. 215 
( 1923) . It reads: 
Did the erroneously admitted evidence 
1strengthen the prosecution? If not admitted, 
might the result have been different? Unless 
they probably affected the result and are clearly 
harmful to defendant, all technical errors must 
be disregarded. Error, when it occurs in a crimi-
nal case, is not presumed to be prejudicial in this 
state. 
Rephrasing the questions to fit the present case, 
we must answer whether further evidence of defendants' 
general reputation in the community would have 
5 
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changed the result? The state contends that it would not 
have made any difference in this case. The defense wit-
ness' were restricted to testifying to defendants' repu-
tation as to truth and vericity. In responding to such a 
question, one witness responded: 
Well, they have been really nice and respectful 
in our family when they come over and every-
thing; and everybody who knows them says they 
are real nice. (Emphasis added.) (Tr. 215) 
The effect of this testimony is that defendants' 
have a good reputation in the community. It is testi-
mony not to their truth and veracity but general repu-
tation and despite the trial court's ruling, the type of 
testimony appellants claim was erroneously excluded 
was, in effect, admitted. 
Turning to the question of whether the alleged 
error probably affected the result, the state contends 
it is doubtful. Since the defense witness' testified de-
fendants had a good reputation for truthfulness (Tr. 
217) and a good reputation in the community (Tr. 
215), the effect was to bolster the testimony given by 
defendants. Since the verdict shows that the jury did 
not believe defendants' alibi defense, it is highly unlikely 
that a little more testimony as to their general repu-
tation in the community would have resulted in a 
different verdict. 
Appellants are further precluded from raising on 
appeal that the trial court ruling was error. Since the 
ruling was not objected to at the trial level, nor an 
6 
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exception taken, the alleged error was not preserved 
for appeal. (Tr. 214) Since no error was claimed at 
the trial court level, the issue of error cannot now be 
raised for the first time before this court. 
Even though this court will notice errors not 
objected to and committed at the trial court level thi.s , 
prerogative is exercised only " ... rarely and with 
caution in an awareness of the importance of timely 
and proper objections." State v. Smith, 16 Utah 2d 374, 
401 P.2d 445 (1965). This court has further stated the 
type of error they will take notice of and when in 
State v. Nelson, 12 Utah 2d 177, 364 P .2d 409 ( 1961) : 
... even the absence of an objection this court 
might nevertheless take note of and correct an 
egregious error. But this could properly be done 
only in an unusual case where there was some sub-
stantial error unobjected to by inadvertence or 
neglect of counsel and where it was of such criti-
cal import that it appears likely an unjust con-
viction resulted therefrom. 
In State v. Nelson, supra, the court continued: 
It would be manifestly unfair to the interests 
of the state and disruptive of the orderly pro-
cesses of law enforcement to permit an accused 
to thus go forward and participate in a trial, 
attempting to obtain a favorable verdict, and 
then after it goes adverse to him, come forward 
with a claim of some antecedent error of irregu-
larity which was known to him prior to the trial, 
contending that such error was fatal and that the 
verdict rendered was invalid anyway. This court 
stated in the case of State v. Gustaldi, 41 Utah 
7 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
63, 123 P. 897, 900: Orderly procedure, as well 
~s t~e rules o~· practice, requires that unless ob-
~ect10ns are tunely interposed, all irregularities 
if any occur at the preliminary examination and 
preceding the filing of the information ... must 
be deemed to be waived. 
As this Court has ruled, the type of error they 
will nofr·e on appeal absent objection is "palpable and 
significant" or "egregious." State v. Smith, supra, 
State v. Nelson, supra. As respondent has shown, if the 
trial court's ruling was error, it did not prejudice the 
defendants in any way nor would further testimony 
have influenced the jury to find a different verdict. 
This error was not significant, palpable or egregious 
so that this court need not exercise its prerogative and 
notice the error on appeal. 
POINT II 
THE DEPOSITION TAKEN BY THE DIS-
TRICT ATTORNEY HAS NOT BEEN :MADE 
PART OF THE RECORD FOR APPEAL AND 
THEREFORE A N Y IRREGULARITIES 
THEREIN ARE NOT PROPER MATTER TO 
BE CONSIDERED ON APPEAL. ANY OBJEC-
TIONS TO THE DEPOSITIONS WERE 
WA I V E D BY APPELLANT \VHEN DE-
FENSE COUNSEL USED THE DEPOSITION 
AT TRIAL. 
Appellants' claim that the taking of certain wit-
ness' depositions prejudicially influenced the courtroom 
8 
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identification of the defendants and further that the 
taking of the deposition was irregular and contrary to 
statute. This deposition is not a part of the record for 
this appeal. Appellant, in his Designation of Record, 
designates "the following to be the record on appeal ... 
1. All of the pleadings and records in the case. 
2. A transcript of the proceedings and Motion for 
New Trial." 
The general rule guiding an appellate court in 
deciding the issues on appeal is that "the rights of the 
parties to an appellate proceeding must be determined 
on the record before the appellate court. The appellate 
court is not required to and may not pass on questions 
not presented by the record, although decided by the 
trial court." 4 Am. J ur. 2d Appeal and Error, § 491. 
Here the deposition is not part of the record and as 
stated by the rule, this court may not pass on questions 
regarding the use of the deposition, irregularities in the 
taking, or any other issues in regard to the deposition 
raised by appellant. The State has not seen the depo-
sition, has not read it and cannot refute the arguments 
made by the appellant since it is not a part of the record. 
Even if appellant has an objection to the deposition, 
under rulings of this court, any such objections were 
waived when defense counsel, and only defense counsel, 
used the deposition of the State's witness in an attempt 
to impeach them. In State v. Tuttle, 16 Utah 2d 288, 
399 P.2d 580, 582 (1965), where defense counsel did 
9 
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not object to the seizure of evidence and continually 
referred to the evidence to aid the defendant, then later 
objected to the search and seizure producing the evi-
dence, the court said: 
No objection was made to the evidence . . . 
Defendant's counsel in his questions continually 
referred to these exhibits. Fairness requires that 
if he disputed the competency of the evidence 
he should make his objection at the earliest rea-
sonable opportunity . . . Inasmuch as he chose 
to conduct his examination upon the basis of this 
evidence, before he stated his objection to it, he 
should be deemed to have waived any such ob-
jection. 
Here, defense counsel used the deposition to im-
peach the State's witness', both .Mrs. Gaydra Jackman 
(Tr. 73-74) and Dan Hatch ';\Tarner (Tr. 133). Since 
he used the depositions to aid defendants, he cannot now 
complain that the depositions were prejudicial to his 
case. 
POINT III 
APPELLANT IS PRECLUDED FROM 
RAISING THE ISSUE THAT DEFENDANT 
ANDRE 'v 'v AS TRIED UNDER THE 
WRONG CHARGE SINCE THERE 'VAS NO 
OBJECTION OR EXCEPTION. 
As the discussion indicates in Respondent's Point 
I failure of counsel to object to the charge at Andrew's 
' 
10 
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arraignment, preliminary hearing, trial and motion for 
a new trial precludes the raising of this issue on appeal. 
Certainly Andrew could be found an accessory 
within the statutory definition, see Utah Code Ann. § 
76-1-45 (1953). He knew a felony had been committed 
and knowingly concealed this fact from a magistrate 
while riding with Ervin to W yarning, doing nothing 
to bring to anyone's attention that a felony had been 
committed, either en route to W yarning or upon arrival. 
These actions indicate a purpose to protect Ervin, 
thereby committing the crime of being an accessory. 
If appellant contends that the information charging 
Andrew with the crime of being an accessory is in error, 
his failure to object to it or move for it to be dismissed 
at any of the pre-trial or trial proceedings precludes 
him from raising the issue on appeal. In State v. 
Durfee, 77 Utah 1, 290 Pac. 962 (1930), the court said: 
If the sufficiency of the information is not 
challenged until after verdict, all defects appear..:. 
ing on the face of the information other than 
the objections that the court is without juris-
diction, and that the focts stated do not consti-
tute a public offense, are waived. 
See also United States v. West, 7 Utah 437, 27 
Pac. 84 ( 1891). Here, the court had personal juris-
diction over the defendant, Andrew. The facts alleged 
in the information constitute the crime for which he 
was charged, and the court had jurisdiction over the 
crime. Therefore, defense counsel's failure to object to 
11 
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the information charging defendant Andrew with being 
an accessory, at any time before or after the trial, pre-
cludes appellant from raising this issue as error on 
appeal. 
POINT IV 
THE COURTROOM IDENTIFICATIONS 
OF THE DEFENDANTS \VERE NOT TAINT-
ED BY EVENTS PRIOR TO TRIAL SO AS TO 
MAKE THEM INADMISSIBLE. 
Appellant argues that the courtroom identification 
of defendant Andrew by Dan Hatch Warner and both 
defendants by Gaydra J acl~man were tainted by the 
District Attorney taking their depositions over a month 
before trial. As has been argued, appellant is precluded 
from arguing that the taking of the depositions were 
prejudicial due to his failure to object that the depo-
sitions were prejudicial at or prior to defendants' trial. 
However, the fact that Dan Hatch \Varner's deposition 
was taken did not make his testimony inherently un-
reliable. As appellant admits, on page 21 of the Amicus 
Brief, "there is certainly nothing wrong with an attor-
ney discussing the case with a witness and going over 
the witness' testimony in preparation for trial . . . " 
Although he states there are limits beyond which an 
attorney should not go, the state contends that the testi-
mony given by Dan Hatch Warner has more validity 
through the deposition process than a private discussion 
with the District Attorney. In taking the oath to tell 
12 
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the truth, 'iV arner is under stronger moral compulsion 
to state the truth than in a private discussion with the 
District Attorney where he is not under oath. Such 
a private interview would solidify a witness' testimony 
without the moral compulsion to tell the truth, under 
oath, that was present here. 
As to Gaydra Jackman, her identification was 
based on observation of the defendant over a 45 minute 
span of time, giving her ample time to be able to observe 
the defendants so that she could identify them. 'iVhile 
she may have hesitated in identifying Ervin after the 
line-up, it was because she remembered him while he was 
wearing dark glasses during the 45 minutes he was in 
her home. When she saw him wearing those glasses at 
the arraignment and at the trial, as she had first observed 
him, she was positive in her identification. 
It must be remembered that in this case, Mrs. 
Jackman observed Ervin for approximately 45 minutes 
and Andrew for approximately 5 to IO minutes. Her 
identifications were not based on any fleeting glance of 
defendants, as was the case in People v. Caruso, 65 Cal. 
Rep. 336, 436 P.2d 336 (Sup. Ct. Cal. 1968). While 
eye-witness identification may not be extremely reliable, 
it become more reliable the longer a person has to 
observe another person. Here, Mrs. Jackman observed 
defendant Ervin for approximately 45 minutes, a period 
of time sufficient for a person to know what a person 
looks like, and to remember his appearance for a long 
time afterwards. 
13 
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As is the case with the state's witness Dan Hatch 
Warner, the deposition procedure did not "taint" Mrs. 
Jackman's courtroom identification any more than a 
private discussion with the District Attorney would, 
and it had the greater moral compulsion for truth since 
it was given under oath. 
POINT V 
THE LINE-UP DID NOT PREJUDICE 
DEFENDANT'S RIGHTS WITHOUT DUE 
PROCESS OF LAW SINCE IT WAS PROPER-
LY CONDUCTED AND DEFENSE COUNSEL 
WAIVED HIS RIGHT TO BE PRESENT. 
As the trial judge stated: 
I do not find ... that there was any unfair-
ness or impropriety in the present line-up. You 
did reproduce it . . . here in the courtroom . . . 
There were many similarities in their appearance 
and certainly in their dress. It is true that there 
were distinguishing features in all of us. I didn't 
find that there was any unfairness in the thing 
... I don't find that there was any impropriety 
in the conduct of the line-up. (Tr. 44, Motion 
for New Trial) 
This statement was based on actual observation of 
those who were present in the line-up as it was recon-
structed in the courtroom. Every attempt was made 
to insure a proper line-up set up by men experienced 
in these matters. It was not so grossly suggestive so as 
to deny defendants a fair trial or their constitutional 
14 
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rights, based on actual observation of the participants 
in the line-up. (Tr. 44, Motion for New Trial) 
Appellants argue that they were denied their right 
to counsel at the line-up. However, the record shows 
that the sheriff asked appellants' only known counsel, 
Mr. Udell Jensen, if he wished to be present at the 
line-up. (Tr. 22-26, Motion for New Trial) This offer 
was rejected by defense counsel. (Tr. 25, Motion for 
New Trial) Under the facts, the sheriff did all he could 
do to protect the defendants' constitutional rights. Mr. 
Udell Jensen waived his right to be present at the 
line-up. It is reasonable to assume that he was repre-
senting defendants since he had been contacted by a 
Rawlins, Wyoming attorney to take the case and his 
testimony at the Motion for a New Trial supports this 
interpretation. (Tr. 12, 16, 23-24, 31, Motion for New 
Trial) 
The facts show that the line-up was not overly nor 
unduly suggestive as to deny defendants their consti-
tutional rights. To the contrary, all possible efforts 
were made to insure its fairness. Mrs. Gaydra Jackman 
was not influenced by suggestive comments or questions 
and made her identifications based on her personal 
observation and recollection. Since the argument for 
the presence of defense counsel at a line-up is to insure 
that identifications are not influenced by suggestive 
comments or questions, appellants cannot complain that 
the absence of counsel affected their rights in this case 
since appellant does not show that any suggestive com-
15 
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ments or questions were asked during the line-up. (Tr. 
79, 82-83) Therefore, their rights were fully protected 
and it is probable there would not have been any differ-
ence in the conduct of the line-up had defense counsel 
been present. If there was any error with the conduct 
of the line-up, it was harmless in nature and did not 
result in ans prejudice to the defendants. Under Utah 
law, Utah Code Ann. § 77-42-1 (1953), non-prejudicial 
error cannot overturn a conviction. 
CONCLUSION 
This appeal constitutes another attempt by guilty 
individuals to subvert the ends of justice. The appellants 
are before this court with a record demonstrating evi-
dence clearly contrary to their contentions, and would 
urge error not preserved by objection or exception. The 
judgment of the lower court should be affirmed. To do 
otherwise would be to ignore a body of evidence of the 
strongest nature and erode our long-established judicial 
processes. 
Respectfully submitted, 
PHIL L. HANSEN 
Attorney General 
GERALD G. GUNDRY 
Assistant Attorney General 
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